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SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO AID OTHER
THAN COUNSEL
In the last decade the judiciary has moved to destroy financial
barriers to justice. This movement has reformulated prior concepts
of the state's role in redressing the inequalities that are attendant
upon poverty in the administration of criminal justice. Beginning
with Griffin v. Illinois' in 1956, continuing through Douglas v.
California2 and expanding in a widening range of decisions to the
present, these cases and their progeny suggest that indigent defen-
dants are now constitutionally guaranteed a congeries of modes of
assistance other than counsel that are ordinarily utilized in the legal
process of truth-finding, yet have been out of reach for the man with-
out means.3
I. THE NEED FOR EQUAL RESOURCES IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Providing for such assistance to criminal defendants who can-
not afford it is a necessity that is imbedded in the very marrow of the
Anglo-American philosophy toward criminal justice. Unlike most
other judicial systems, ours is one based on the premise that the
truth prevails by the conflict of adversaries serving opposing self-
interests, each presenting his point of view with the utmost deter-
mination born of that self-interest.4
The assumption inherent in such a system is that counsel for the
defense will have at his disposal the tools essential for the conduct of
a proper defense; 5 that the parties are roughly comparable in legal,
investigative and expert resources.0 Consistent with this assumption,
the prestigious Allen Committee Report7 recognized the danger to
1 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
2 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
3 See Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants,
47 MNN. L. REv. 1054 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 47 MINN. L. REV.].
4 See Steinberg & Paulson, A Conversation with Defense Counsel on Problems of a
Criminal Defense, 7 PAc. LAW., May, 1961, at 25 [hereinafter cited as Steinberg].
5 REPORT OF U.S. ATroRNEy GENERAL'S COMMrrrEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-
"noN oF FEDERAL CRimiNAL JusricE 46 [hereinafter cited as ATr'y GEN. REP.] ABA,
STANDARDS RELATiNG TO PRovmING DEFENSE SERvicEs § 1.5 & Commentary (Tent. Draft
1967).
8 47 MINN. L. REv., supra note 3, at 1065.
7 This is officially the ATr'y GEN. REP., supra note 5. The chairman of the Attorney
General's committee was Professor Francis A. Allen of the University of Chicago Law
School, now Dean and Professor at the University of Michigan Law School.
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an adversary system when the resources of the accused are not on a
substantial par with those of the accuser:
The proper performance of the defense function is... as vital
to the health of the system as the performance of the prosecut-
ing and adjudicatory functions. It follows that insofar as the
financial status of the accused impedes vigorous and proper
challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the ad-
versary system... [T]he system is imperiled by the large num-
bers of accused persons ... able to pay some part of the costs
of defense, but unable to finance a full and proper defense.8
Indeed, at the trial level a self-evident proposition is that lawyers
cannot successfully defend without facts and witnesses,9 with the
overall omnipresent problem for assigned counsel being lack of
money.10 This need for resources for investigation is a factor that
helps destroy the equality that the adversary system requires, with
the consequence that the system suffers in practice."
This philosophy of an adversary system, which requires that
some defendants be supplied with aid in addition to counsel in
order to insure equality in legal resources, is embodied within the
constitutional concepts of due process and equal protection. Justice
Black in his Griffin opinion mentions that "equal justice for all"
has been the ultimate goal of peoples everywhere from the begin-
ning of time to the present,'2 and that "in this tradition, our own
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both
call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious dis-
criminations between persons and different groups of persons."13
On this same subject the eminent champion of the indigent defen-
dant's rights, Judge Jerome Frank, said
[A] man [even with appointed counsel] may be jailed for life,
or even electrocuted, because he hasn't the money to discover a
8 Id. at 10; see Solomon, "This New Fetish for Indigency": Justice and Poverty in
an Affluent Society, 66 COLUm. L. Rv. 248 (1966).
9 Prettyman, The Modern Problems in Criminal Law, 18 LASE & E L. REV.
187, 214 (1961).
10 Id. at 217; Steinberg, supra note 4, at 28, where the authors said
[i]t takes money to have laboratory tests made; to have photographs made;
to copy documents; to have necessary examinations made. It wUill take money
for depositions....
11 Steinberg, supra note 4, at 32.
12 351 US. 12, 16-17 (1956). Justice Black quotes from L ,rtcus 19:15 (King James)
. in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor".) and the Magna Charta to
illustrate his point.
13 Id. at 17.
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missing document to win his case or to employ a competent
hand-writing expert or psychiatrist.
This is not democratic justice. It makes a farce of "equality
before the law," one of the first principles of a democracy. 14
Thus we see that the desirability, the need and the constitu-
tional vehicles for providing such services exist; but the implementa-
tion of such a program is fraught with problems, not the least of which
is to determine the outer limits of the constitutional rights of indi-
gents and the constitutional duty of a state to ensure those rights.
The principal question is what types of aid a state must make
available at a minimum to ensure the proper functioning of the
adversary system with regard to those defendants too poor to pay
for desired aid in addition to counsel. To answer it we must first
decide the more fundamental question of what is the constitutional
theory which underlies the right.
II. THE SUPREME COURT RATIONALE FOR THE RIGHT TO AID
IN ADDITION TO COUNSEL
The principal litigation in this area stems from state appellate
procedures for review requiring the appellant either to procure a
transcript or to pay a filing fee in order to have his appeal docketed.
The constitutional challenges to such procedures invariably have
been via the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protec-
tion clauses but, as will be seen, the decisions have increasingly
been grounded solely upon the equal protection clause. 15
The first case in this area, Griffin v. Illinois,16 concerned a state
requirement that a trial transcript be used in reviewing all criminal
convictions. State law did not provide for free transcripts to be
furnished to indigent defendants convicted of non-capital crimes.
The petitioners, indigents convicted of non-capital crimes, alleged
a denial of due process and equal protection when the state rejected
14 Frank, Today's Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D,
93, 101 (1953). Judge Frank was so concerned by the plight of the poor in the admin.
istration of criminal justice that he once declared that he could not sleep knowing
that "innocent destitute men may be behind bars solely because it will cost the govern.
ment something to have their appeals considered." United States v. Johnson, 238 F,2d
565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
15 As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that there is no problem here of
finding the requisite state action. The procedures challenged are all specifically Imposed
either statutorily or judicially. See infra note 54 for further amplification.
16 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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their requests for free transcripts.17 They asserted that this failure
to supply free transcripts precluded them from raising nonconstitu-
tional trial errors solely because of their lack of funds to purchase
the transcript, and that the refusal thus constituted both a funda-
mentally unfair procedure and an invidious discrimination between
rich and poor.
The case presented the first opportunity for the Supreme Court
to focus on the effect of indigency in the administration of our
criminal system.' 8 Justice Black, speaking for four of the five major-
ity justices,'2 seemingly rested the decision on both due process
and equal protection grounds when he stated that
our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which
allow no invidious discrimination between persons .... Both
equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of
our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must,
so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before the
bar of justice ... ."21
Justice Douglas has since explicitly stated that equal protection
was the basis of the decision,22 and the dominant language of the
opinion is that of equal protection.2 But the language of due process
17 It is to be noted that the defendant's requests for transcripts were denied in a
direct appellate proceeding. The present questions were raised by a petition under the
Illinois Postconviction Hearing Act, ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to-7 (1963), collater-
ally challenging that denial on the direct appeal.
3.8 Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case--Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment,
43 CoRNr.= L.Q. 1, 10 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Willcox]:
The record presented the issue of poverty in complete isolation, as if in the
test tube of a chemical laboratory. It was uncontaminated by such factors as the
ignorance or illiteracy of the man or the hostility of the crowd. ... . Griffin
might have been the popular idol of the crowd; he might have been a learned
doctor of jurisprudence; it would not have mattered. All that mattered was
his lack of money.
19 Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas and
Mr. Justice Clark. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion.
20 See Willcox, supra note 18, at 10-11; Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv. L. REv. 435, 436-37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
81 HARv. L. REv.].
21 351 U.S. at 17 (citation omitted).
22 Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (Douglas, J., sitting as circuit
judge). Referring to Griffin Douglas said, "we have held that an indigent defendant is
denied equal protection of the law if he is denied an appeal on equal terms with other
defendants, solely because of his indigence." 81 S. Ct. at 197.
23 The opinion asserts that "the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence...." 351 U.S. at 17-18.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
is also present. While recognizing that due process does not require
a state to provide either appellate courts or the right to appellate
review, the Court also emphasized that where these are provided by
a state they have become integral parts of the state's trial system for
finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Thus
to deny their use to an indigent because of his poverty is an in-
vidious discrimination which is so lacking in fairness as to violate
due process as well as equal protection.24
To find a due process problem when there is no denial of a
right guaranteed by that constitutional clause is not anomolous.
Denial of a privilege which due process does not require to be pro-
vided in all cases may come to deprive a defendant of due process
if the denial is arbitrarily applied to some persons but not to
others.2 5 The reason for this is that equal protection and due pro-
cess overlap.26 Equal protection of the laws is a more explicit safe-
guard of prohibited unfairness than is due process of law, but a
discrimination may be so unjustifiable that it is also violative of
due process. 27 In turn, equal protection is heavily affected by
notions of fundamental unfairness. 2 The conventional limitations
that the discrimination must be either intentionally discriminatory
in purpose or else arbitrary in effect to offend equal justice do
not apply where the discrimination results in something that shocks
Further, Mr. Justice Black points out that "[tjherc is no meaningful distinction
between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves In a trial
court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review
accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance." Id. at 18.
Finally, he says
Such a denial [of a transcript for indigents] is a misfit in a country dedicated to
affording equal justice to all.... There can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defen-
dants must be affored as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts. Id. at 19.
24 351 U.S. at 18-19.
To deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them may lose
their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate
courts would set aside. Id. at 19.
25 Wilcox, supra note 18, at 11 n.41; see Wieman v. Updegraff, 544 U.S. 185, 191
(1952).
26 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 20, at 459.
27 Compare Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) with Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28 Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARv. L. RV. 83, 126 (1956).
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the sense of fundamental justice.2 9 The net effect is that due process
and equal protection differ more in emphasis than in content-due
process emphasizes fundamental unfairness and equal protection
dwells upon comparisons of the treatment by a state of different
persons or groups of persons.30
The conclusion to be drawn from Griffin is that the Court was
concerned with a situation in which it felt no compulsion to con-
struct a rigid constitutional basis for decision. Arguably the justices
could have decided the question under either clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Such a course is, as we know, not an unusual
one for the Court to take since it allows flexibility to formulate a
workable theory as future developments shed more light upon the
area.
In the next case that presented to the Court this question of
the constitutionality of a denial of a free transcript, Esridge v.
Washington Prison Bd.,3 it again refused to specify any particular
fourteenth amendment ground for decision. Here, the state granted
a right to appeal criminal convictions; the state conceded, however,
that an effective appeal could not be prosecuted without a trial
transcript, which was furnished to indigent defendants at public ex-
pense only if "justice will be promoted" thereby in the opinion of
the trial judge. Petitioner was denied a free transcript by the trial
judge on the ground that he received a fair trial with no prej-
udicial errors committed. On a petition for certiorari, the Supreme
Court merely held that a constitutional right guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment was violated. The Court was concerned both
with the adequacy of review and with a comparison of the review
actually afforded with that available to a man of means. The need
to retreat to the "more explicit safeguards" of equal protection
presumably was not present in Eskridge because the spector of a
trial judge sitting as a final arbiter on his own allegedly erroneous
conduct of the trial is sufficient to arouse one's sense of unfairness.32 -
-9 Willcox, supra note 18, at 15; see Comment, Constitutional Law-Post-conviction
Due Process-Right of Indigent to Review of Non-Constitutional Trial Errors, 55
Mc. L. R-V. 413, 416-18, 422 (1957).
30 Willcox, supra note 18, at 15.
31 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
32 See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (material facts similar to
those in Eskridge), where the Court said that "[w]hat was impermissible was the total
denial to petitioners of any means of getting adequate review on the merits in the
State Supreme Court, when no such clog on the process of getting contentions before
the State Supreme Court attends the appeals of defendants with money." Id. at 498.
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These two decisions seem to develop a "joint clause" approach
to the problem of denial of state aid in addition to counsel for in.
digents. Common to both constitutional guarantees is an assessment
by the courts of the importance to the poor of the underlying priv-
ilege being asserted.33 In these direct appeal cases, it seems the judges
are concluding that deprivation of the right to appeal is not of it-
self violative of due process but, when taken in conjunction with
the admittedly unequal treatment that a state affords an indigent
by its appellate procedure, there is a wrong of sufficient moment
to run afoul of the fourteenth amendment even if the discrimina-
tion might not meet the traditional test used to find a denial of
equal protection.8 4 The sum of two wrongs, though not enough
separately to violate constitutional guarantees, is sufficient when
taken together to violate the fourteenth amendment.
Unlike the early transcript cases, the Supreme Court used a
pure equal protection analysis to strike down state provisions that
conditioned entry into the appellate process upon payment of a
filing fee or any other state-imposed costs. In Burns v. Ohio8 5 the
Court compared the right of a man who has the resources to pay
the filing fee, and thus to have an appellate court consider his ap-
plication for appeal regardless of frivolity, with that of a man
who cannot afford to pay such costs. In holding that it was in
effect an arbitrary discrimination by the state against the poor, the
Court rejected an argument that filing fees served a legitimate
govermental purpose by preventing frivolous appeals when it said
"there is no rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions
for leave to appeal will be less meritorious than those of other
defendants."3 6 Thus, the means utilized by the state to deter friv-
olous appeals was not reasonably related to that purpose, assumedly
because such fees are not usually high enough to have an effect upon
the decision of an ordinary man of means to prosecute an appeal.
This amounts to an equal protection violation under traditional
analysis.3 7
33 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 20, at 439.
84 Cf. Willcox, supra note 18, at 24, and text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
35 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
36 Id. at 27-58.
37 See also Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), where the Court held that the
Burns rationale applies as well to filing fees for collateral, habeas corpus proceedings.
The Court said broadly that "to interpose any financial consideration between an
indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is
to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 709; Williams v. Dlstrict
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The different problems found in the filing fee cases and the
transcript cases seemed to merge in Lane v. Brown,38 where the de-
fendant raised an equal protection claim because he was refused
a transcript of a hearing denying a writ of error coram nobis.
The Court recognized that one could question the applicability of
the Griffin principle to collateral proceedings but, noting that Smith
v. Bennett39 had applied the Griffin rationale to collateral proceed-
ings,40 held that the state must supply a transcript even though
there had already been one direct appeal on the merits.4 1 The in-
ference is that the Court was reluctant to apply the joint clause con-
cept of Griffin, founded in part upon the notion that direct appeals
are integral to the trial system and that to deny such appeals brings
forth "fringe" due process notions, to collateral proceedings not
integrally bound up with the initial truth-finding process. Smith's
broad equal protection language 2 enabled the Court to support
its result but it also seems to have forced the Court into impliedly
asserting that Griffin actually could have been decided solely upon
equal protection grounds. One aberrational characteristic of the
Lane case, however, diminishes the force of such an inference and
explains the Court's willingness to use Smith as a precedent-
although Lane involved a transcript for use on appeal, and Burns
and Smith were concerned with filing fees, the cases are similar in
that Indiana required a transcript be filed to confer jurisdiction.
Thus the transcript operated much like a filing fee and could be
seen as bringing Lane within those two unequivocal equal protec-
tion cases rather than within the mixed rationale of Griffin.
Any such doubts about the basis of Lane were resolved when the
Court was faced in Long v. District Ct. of Iowa" with a situation
in a collateral proceeding essentially like that in Griffin in a direct re-
view context. The Long opinion utilized equal protection to guar-
antee the right, again apparently because the "fringe" due process
Ct., 417 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1966), for another application of equal protection to strike down
filing fees as to indigents in collateral proceedings.
38 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
39 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
40 "In Smith v. Bennett the Court made dear that these Griffin principles were not
to be limited to direct appeals from criminal convictions but extended alike to state
post-conviction proceedings." 372 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 485.
42 365 US. at 709.
4 372 US. 477, 480 (1963).
44 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
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element that is present in a direct appeal situation seems less ap-
parent in an appeal from a post-conviction hearing. Whether one
labels it a privilege or a right, the opportunity to appeal directly a
conviction is of unquestioned importance to the guilt-determination
process. 45 If that opportunity is not administered on such terms as
will insure that it is granted equally, a question of fundamental
fairness is inextricably woven into the case with the question of
equal protection. However, an appeal from a collateral proceeding--
the post-conviction remedy-is not so bound up with the guilt-de-
termining process as is an appeal from a direct proceeding, when
one considers (1) what would seem to be a lower frequency of re-
leases brought about through the post-conviction remedy as com-
pared to reversals after direct appeal, and (2) the fact that in many
cases the defendant in the collateral proceeding has already appealed
his case on the merits, often through two or even three levels of a
direct appellate proceeding.4 The result is that the Supreme Court
in Griffin was not compelled to supply a specific basis for decision,
but when situations arose where the fundamental unfairness of a
state's denial of some type of assistance was not so apparent, equal
protection came to the fore. The Court might have but did not
distinguish Burns and Smith as "access" cases from Griffin and Long
as "adequacy of review" cases. Considering them as a single class
of cases seems to mean that the Court has declared Griffin to be
based solely upon the equal protection clause. It should also be noted
that in Long, the equal protection clause was not triggered in a
vacuum. While that collateral proceeding was not integral to guilt-
determination, it was not insignificant, i.e., there was a judgment
45 Id. at 194.
40 But see Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963); Bums v. Ohio, 860 U.S. 252,
257 (1959). In Burns, Ohio tried to distinguish Griffin on the basis that it had already
afforded defendant one review on the merits while Illinois had left defendant with no
judicial review of his conviction. The Supreme Court said this was a distinction without
a difference for, as Griffin held, once a state chooses to establish appellate review in
criminal cases it cannot foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty. The Lane case reaffirmed this position in a coral" nobis
context. It would thus seem that the Court makes no real distinction between the
number of appeals provided or between whether the review is direct or collateral.
However, there is a real distinction on the basis of efficacy of guilt-determination
between collateral and direct reviews. The system of collateral review would not seem to
be so integrally related to guilt-determination as is direct review, and thus the conclusion
that due process is not so inextricably involved in such a setting.
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about the worth of the requested assistance before invocation of the
equal protection clause.47
III. TRANSCRiPTS AND Aims FOR MISDEMEANANTS
The rationale of the aforementioned cases is useful to explain
other decisions rejecting the contention that a state must furnish
an indigent a transcript for appeal of a misdemeanor conviction.
In Toledo v. Smith48 a fourteenth amendment objection was raised
after the state had refused to furnish a trial transcript to a man con-
victed of drunk and disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The
Ohio Supreme court first held that a narrative bill of exceptions
would suffice to show the errors claimed,49 thereby extracting from
the case any quasi-due process claims. Thus, unless there was an
equal protection claim meritorious in itself, the sum of the wrongs
to the defendant was not sufficient to be constitutionally improper.
The court then compared the indigent misdemeanant's position
with that of a man financially capable of securing the transcript in
question. Interestingly, they held that to require a state to furnish
a transcript to an indigent defendant in every case would not be
equal justice because such a rule would permit indigents to appeal
frivolously while others must consider the costs.8 0 This is the con-
verse of the argument made in other cases that to deny an indigent
a transcript because his appeal seems frivolous (and therefore would
not warrant the cost of a transcript) violates equal protection when
a richer man can appeal frivolously." ' As support for the Ohio
court's argument, Griffin language is quoted to the effect that when
a state not only gives leave to appeal but must also pay for costs, it
may protect itself against subsidizing frivolous appeals.5 2
The Smith position on this point is not inconsistent with that
of the United States Supreme Court when one considers the con-
text in which both courts were working. The Supreme Court was
considering felony cases in which the ultimate result of a successful
47 That judgment seems to be simply that any state-established reviewing proce-
dure is at least valuable enough that finandal considerations should not determine its
practical availability. Cf. 81 HzAv. L. Rav., supra note 20, at 439.
48 3 Ohio St. 2d 80, 209 N.E.2d 410 (1965). cert. denied, 383 U.. 949 (1966).
49 Id. at 81, 209 N.E.2d at 411.
50 Id. at 81-82, 209 N.-2d at 411.
51 E.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.. 252 (1959).
82 3 Ohio St. 2d at 82, 209 N.E.2d at 411. The quote was from Frankfurters con-
curring opinion, 351 U.S. at 24.
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appeal was more personally valuable to a defendant; for example,
a felony defendant is usually faced with long incarceration if he
decides not to appeal. By contrast, a misdemeanant either pays a
fine or serves a short jail sentence usually of no more than six
months. The interests at stake in felony and misdemeanor cases,
then, are widely disparate and a felony defendant would be less
likely to be dissuaded by either the cost or the frivolity of an appeal
than would a misdemeanant. Monetary factors, therefore, are
not a serious consideration to a felony defendant and for the
state to impose them in a felony case puts an unequal burden upon
the indigent. But the less substantial personal interest of a mis-
demeanant in having his conviction reviewed is not valued highly
enough to remove from his consideration the financial burdens of
an appeal. Hence, it not only does not deprive an indigent of equal
protection of the laws for a state to impose monetary conditions as
a price for a frivolous appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, but to
remove them would deprive non-indigent misdemeanants of equal
protection because their decision to appeal is still influenced by
financial considerations. The import of the decision is to restrict the
duty of states to supply free transcripts to felons, even if a mis-
demeanant has a legitimate ground for appeal, provided however
that the state makes an adequate alternative available (e.g., a nar-
rative or bystander's bill of exceptions) in order to insure that legit-
imate claims of misdemeanants will not be totally barred because
of poverty.53
IV. ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN COUNSEL AT THE
PRE-CONVICTION LEVEL
Transcripts are aids other than counsel that are provided by the
state for use on appeal. Extensive litigation has clearly secured their
provision at no cost to an indigent felony defendant. The discussion
now turns to the duty of a state to assist indigents in procuring
services from private sources in the pre-conviction period that are not
preconditions to presenting a defense, i.e., the state does not affirma-
tively require their procurement, yet they are types of services
without which the chances of a successful defense are seriously
hampered. 54
53 See Long v. District Ct. of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
54 There is no problem of finding the requisite state action for purposes of invoking
the equal protection clause. State action is to be found in the fact that it has established
a criminal judicial system, has enacted and undertaken enforcement of laws, has
endeavoured to bring offenders into its guilt-determination process against the defen.
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We have already seen the expansion of Griffin; it is argued by
many writers that the combined reasoning of Griffin and Douglas v.
California55 provide substantial support for requiring states to provide
funds where needed for many additional types of assistance other
than counsel, such as pretrial investigatory services, expert witnesses,
discovery and securing of witnesses.50 The judicial reasoning that has
required counsel and transcripts on appeal in order to achieve some
degree of "constitutional" equality seems to support 'with equal per-
suasiveness a constitutional right to other aid in addition to counsel
at the trial level; in fact an effective trial would seem more important
than the various forms of aid that the Court has required on appeal.57
The underlying interest of the defendant in protecting his freedom
is the same and the community interest in accurately determining
guilt would be, if anything, better served.58 Although the trials
dant's will, and has imposed a trial procedure that requires the defendant to use his
own resources to defend himself against the wrath of the state. See Goldberg, Equality
and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205 (1964) where it was said:
When the poor are denied equal justice in a criminal trial, there can be no
question of state action, involvement, and responsibility. The state is the
"plaintiff"; it elects or appoints the judges; it hires the prosecutors;, it retains
and compensates expert witnesses and investigators; it arrests and often incar-
cerates the accused; and it lodges the convicted in its jails. Id. at 217.
55 372 U.S. 353 (1963). California law provided appellate counsel for indigents only
after a preliminary showing by the defendant of meritorious grounds for appeal. The
Court held that this was a denial of equal protection. It reasoned that although a state
may "provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due
process or an 'invidious discrimination'," id. at 856, California had drawn an unconstitu-
tional line between rich and poor. Justice Douglas, in conjunction with this, goes on to
say that
[t]here is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where
the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examina-
tion into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his
behalf, while the indigent ... is forced to shift for himself. Id. at 357-58.
The practical effect of the California law, pure on paper, was to deny equal treatment
to paupers. See also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Swenson v. Bosler, 386
U.S. 258 (1967); Hardy v. United States, 875 US. 277 (1964).
56 E.g., 81 HtAv. L. REv., supra note 20, at 448; Pye, The Administration of Criminal
Justice, 66 COLUmn. L. Rxv. 286, 299 (1966); Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Ac-
tion, 59 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 205,218,222 (1964); 47 MmNN. L. REv., supra note 3, at 1058; Gold-
stein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 1061, 1088 (1962). See also Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YAm L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960); Rosen, Contemporary
Winds and Currents in Criminal Law, with Special Reference to Constitutional Pro-
cedure: A Defense and Appreciation, 27 A. L. Rv. 103, 122 (1967).
57 47 MINN. L. REv., supra note 8, at 1074.
58 See generally 81 HAv. L. !rv., supra note 20, at 440-42.
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themselves perhaps would be somewhat more expensive, they as-
sumedly would result in fewer erroneous convictions. The higher
cost of trials conceivably would be offset by the fact that society is
neither wasting productive human beings, nor burdened with the
care and maintenance in prisons of erroneously convicted indigents.
To this point, the problem considered has been simply whether
equal protection is the proper constitutional vehicle to guarantee
such services; the question now becomes what aid should be ex-
tended and to whom?
A. Who is an Indigent?
The Allen Committee has recommended that an "indigent" be
defined as a defendant who cannot afford a particular service at the
time of trial.59 Thus a defendant who can absorb the cost of counsel
and discovery may well be an indigent for purposes of securing the
services of an expert witness or private investigator. Such a definition
would balance the opportunities available to defendants of varied
financial circumstances.
B. What Aid Must Be Provided?
It would seem that the equal protection clause would require a
greater variety and scope of aids to be provided than would the due
process clause. Equal protection is a concept less amenable to judicial
flexibility in interpretation than is due process' "fundamental fair-
ness" concept because equal protection is a more specific guarantee
than the fundamental fairness guarantee of due process; its scope is
wider.6 0 Thus, due process certainly does not impose upon a state the
duty to furnish a defendant with a Hart, Shaffner & Marx suit merely
because the prosecutor nor the defendant in the next courtroom is
wearing one, or the duty to finance an indigent's, search for a wit-
ness whose testimony will be the same as that of an available witness
although the available witness may be an ex-convict subject to
impeachment. It is in this netherland where the limits of Griffin,
Douglas and equal protection will be found.
1. Transcripts and Fees at the Pre-Conviction Level
In the last two years, the courts have extended the right to free
transcripts to include the furnishing by the state of preliminary hear-
59 A'r'y GEmN. REP., supra note 5, at 45-49; Solomon, "This New Fetish for
Indigency": Justice and Poverty in an Affluent Society, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 255.56
(1966).
60 See Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497p 499 (1954).
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ing transcripts for use at the trial of the indigent,6' and of transcripts
of prior mistrials for the purpose of impeaching witnesses at a new
trial. 62 But courts have denied the motion for a transcript of a prior
trial or mistrial for use at a hearing for a new trial on the ground
that such uses of transcripts are equally denied to all. The purposes
for which the latter transcripts were proposed to be used were ones
for which even affluent defendants could not use them. It is probable,
therefore, that if a legitimate use for a transcript should arise at the
trial level, and if the state permits their use, equal protection would
impose upon the state a duty to furnish free transcripts to indigents."'
The Burns and Smith cases also require a state to waive payment of
any trial court fees, including "court costs." The Long rationale
applies once a judgment is made by the court that a requested tran-
script or waiver of a fee would be a "not insignificant" aid in develop-
ing the truth, even though it would not be fundamentally unfair to
refuse the request.
2. Expert Witnesses
There have been a number of cases considering the constitu-
tional duty of a state to financially aid indigents in acquiring expert
witnesses, but most have been decided by a due process fair trial
approach. In People v. Watson65 the defendant had been indicted for
an attempt to commit forgery; the primary issue was whether the
signature on a check was that of the defendant. The court held that
due process required a handwriting expert be supplied to aid the
defendant. This was a case in which lack of funds completely pre-
cluded the defendant from developing his primary defense; the dis-
crimination was held to be so arbitrary as to constitute a denial of
due process. The court also hinted that the equal protection clause
had been violated under these facts but avoided this question because
of the omnipresence of the due process violation. 0
61 E.g., Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 US. 40 (1967); People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.2d
993, 224 N.E.2d 730, 278 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1966).
62 E.g., People v. Delafosse, 36 IM. 2d 327, 223 NE.2d 125 (1967); People v. Miller,
35 Il1. 2d 615, 221 NXE.2d 653 (1966).
63 Eg., People v. Putty, 59 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (Ct. App. 1967); Brown v. State,
1 Md. App. 571, 574, 232 A.2d 261, 263 (1967).
64 Cf. Brown v. State, 1 Md. App. 571, 574, 232 A.2d 261, 263 (1967). "WThen the
State constitutionally or statutorily affords a defendant a right, the exercise thereof
cannot be conditioned upon the defendant's ability to pay." People v. Montgomery
18 N.Y.2d 993, 994, 278 N.YS.2d 226, 227, 224 N.E.2d 730, 731 (1966) (citations omitted).
65 36 IMI. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
66 See id. at 232-33, 221 N.E2d at 646.
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Two other cases point up the apparent overlap of these two
constitutional guaranties in the area of providing for expert witnesses.
These cases involved psychiatric testimony. In Bush v. McCollumGT
psychiatrists treated the defendant for eighty-nine days in a state
mental hospital. Later these psychiatrists testified as prosecuting wit-
nesses at a sanity hearing that defendant was sane. The state trial
court denied the indigent defendant's request for a psychiatrist of
his own to aid him in his defense. As a consequence he was unable to
secure a favorable witness to testify in support of his defense, or to
effectively cross-examine the State's psychiatric witnesses. On habeas
corpus, the federal district court held that the state court's denial
was a violation of due process. But Jacobs v. United States8 reached
the same result under an equal protection rationale.
... [D]efendant, if financially able, would have had the right
to call a privately retained psychiatrist as a witness. It is obvious
that only his inability to pay for the services of a psychiatrist
prevented a proper presentation of his case. 60
These three cases all establish that, so long as our criminal justice
is determined by the techniques of an adversary system, a state has
a duty to provide an indigent defendant with expert assistance in the
trial of technical issues when those issues are germane to the indi-
gent's defense and when the only expert testimony in the case is that
which is provided by a witness for the prosecution. In such a case,
there is no conflict of adversaries. The trial, devoid of even a mini-
mally adequate litigation of the issues, does not meet the standards
of due process. Neither, however, is equal protection satisfied when
one considers that all defendants possess a right to have witnesses
testify in their behalf,70 a right which holds no meaning for the man
who cannot afford to compensate the witnesses whom he subpoenas.
The disparity in the constitutional vehicles by which these three
cases proclaimed the duty to exist can be explained on a jurispru-
dential basis. The factual situations are consistent with the concept
that both the due process and the equal protection guaranties are
violated when there is a discrimination so arbitrary in effect as to also
violate notions of fundamental fairness-in these cases the inequality
resulting from the defendants' poverty utterly destroyed their possi-
67 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
08 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965).
69 Id. at 573.
70 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "in all criminal prosecutions, the accuscd shall enjoy
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . .. ."
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biities for a successful defense. Thus, the courts in Bush and Watson,
like the Supreme Court in Griffin, had the luxury of deciding the
cases by the more familiar and more traditional due process clause.
There was no compulsion to strike out into new areas with the equal
protection clause. That Jacobs was decided by a federal court of
appeals tends to explain the court's lack of hesitancy to invoke the
equal protection clause, for courts of appeals interpret the Constitu-
tion as a routine function. On the other hand district courts, such as
the court which decided Bush, whose overwhelming, mass of work is
merely the litigation of cases according to established law, are under-
standably reluctant to extend the reach of a constitutional provision
to an area to which the highest Court has not yet addressed itself. As
for Watson, decided by a state supreme court in the context of a
federal system of government, it is again understandable that such a
court would be more hesitant to interpret the federal constitution in
a manner not yet adopted by the Supreme Court.
The real force of equal protection to impose a constitutional
duty on a state to pay the costs of securing expert witnesses for
indigent criminal defendants must be evaluated in light of a situation
where there is no strong due process element. Such a situation occurs
when a state has provided for an impartial expert to analyze the
relevant data and give his conclusions on such issues as sanity, the
authenticity of a signature or the results of a lie detector test. The
state thereby assures at least a minimally adequate trial of that issue.
The problem under equal protection arises in those instances when
conclusions of the impartial, court-appointed expert are adverse to
the defendant's assertions on the question being argued. If the state
then permits a defendant to employ an independent psychiatrist or
other expert witness, the rich man may have a significant advantage
over the indigent. On the other hand, if the state prohibits all defen-
dants from employing an independent expert witness, regardless of
the conclusions of the impartial expert or of the means of the defen-
dant, it would seem that constitutional inequities are extracted from
consideration. 71
71 However, it is possible that equal protection may be denied by indirection. For
example, one could agree that the Sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel is denied a defendant if his attorney cannot utilize the aid of a privately
retained expert to examine the neutral witness, or that due process is denied if a
defendant is denied the benefit of expert rebuttal testimony. Success in either argument
would then restore the heretofore discussed advantage of the rich over the poor. Cf.
Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and The Insanity Defense,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 1061 (1962) [hereinafter dted as Goldstein & Fine].
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In two pre-Grifin cases, where impartial psychiatric witnesses
were provided, the Supreme Court and a federal court of appeals
rejected requests for state-financed independent psychiatric witnesses
on the ground that there was no deprivation of a fair trial, and hence
of due process. 72 A recent state court case, People v. Hill,'1 also denied
an equal protection claim on a similar issue. The constitutionality of
blanket denials of such requests, however, are questionable under an
equal protection rationale. Even though an impartial expert is pro-
vided-to examine a defendant and testify to his sanity, or to analyze
either a signature or lie detector results and testify to his conclu-
sions-it is of no litigious help when the expert draws a conclusion
contrary to the trial position of the defendant. The defendant is
back where he began, without expert assistance in preparing and
buttressing his defense. Indeed, the indigent defendant may have a
greater need for independent expert help in this situation than in
the situation where no impartial expert has been appointed. It is now
incumbent upon him to attempt to undercut the impartial expert's
testimony either by informed cross-examination or by opposing
expert testimony. During cross-examination he is not adequately pre-
pared to question the expert effectively on technical matters. Further-
more, he has no expert to give opposing testimony. For both methods,
money is the obstacle to preparing an adequate defense to countervail
the state's witness. In addition, the defendant now is disadvantaged
because of a jury's tendency to give greater weight to impartial testi-
mony. Thus, although there is an ostensible assurance of a trial of
the issue, there still remains an undeniable inequality between rich
and poor defendants.74 It may be noted that in Hill the court had no
occasion to consider this precise question. The defendant there re-
fused an examination by a court-appointed impartial psychiatrist and
instead requested funds to hire an independent: psychiatrist. If the
defendant had acquiesced in an examination by an impartial expert
and then, when it became apparent that the expert would testify
against him, had requested independent assistance to aid him in
cross-examination and in rebuttal testimony, equal protection might
have required the Hill court to grant his request.
72 United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953); McGarty v. O'Brien,
188 F.2d 151, 157 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951). See Goldstein & Fine, supra
note 71, at 1086-88 for an interesting analysis of the impact of the equal protection
clause in this area.
7-3 66 Cal. 2d 536, 568, 58 Cal. Rptr. 340, 860, 426 P.2d 908, 928 (1967).
74 See generally Goldstein & Fine, supra note 71, at 1061.
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Appointment of impartial experts has proliferated as a method
of avoiding the often deplored "battle of experts." The argument
against permitting conflicting expert testimony is that it tends to
confuse a jury and cloud the issue. But, if the goal of trial procedures
is to promote rational fact-finding, the advantages of using opposing
experts far outweigh the advantages of using an impartial expert.
The "battle of experts" is a process that allows jurors to pierce expert
testimony and discover why that expert concludes as he has. In the
field of psychiatry, for example, there is no consensus of opinion on
the conclusions to questions that are likely to arise at a trial or sanity
hearing. Likewise, there is no consensus of opinion on the qualifica-
tions of persons competent to present such answers, nor on the tech-
niques that should be utilized to arrive at conclusions. The reasons
for the disparate results are usually found in the individual back-
grounds of the expert witnesses. Psychiatrists differ over the proper
work systems, their value systems and the school of psychiatry to
which they adhere. These factors may explain differences in their
conclusions or may point up the fact that there are alternative expert
interpretations of the same set of relevant facts. Yet, by use of an
impartial expert, these factors remain unknown to a jury. There is
no effective cross-examination or rebuttal testimony without the
"battle of experts." 75
The conclusion to be drawn is that indigents, because of their
poverty, are at a disadvantage in the litigation of a technical issue
upon which an impartial expert has concluded against the trial posi-
tion of the defendant, when the state permits an independent expert
to be privately retained. This disadvantage could be a significant
influence on the ultimate outcome of the issue. The Supreme Court
has commanded, at the least, that a state minimize those inequities
in the administration of criminal justice that are the result of
poverty; 76 where a state permits the man of means to secure his own
expert to testify in his behalf even though an impartial expert witness
is provided, the state has fostered a condition that denies equal pro-
tection of the laws to indigent defendants. It has lessened the inequi-
ties through appointment of an impartial expert, but so long as there
is no prohibition upon a defendant retaining his own expert witness,
a state has failed to minimize these inequities.
75 Id. at 1067-70.
76 See 47 MiNN. L. RFv., supra note 8, at 1074. Cf. Ar'y GN. REP., supra note 5,
at 96.
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A further problem is the question of how extensively a state
must endeavour to assure an indigent of the services of an expert
witness. Obviously, it is not necessary to finance a countless number
of examinations until the defendant finds an expert who will support
his opinion. The limitations of the state's duty may have been im-
plied in Toledo v. Smith77 where the Ohio Supreme Court suggested
that misdemeanants do not usually purchase three hundred and fifty
dollar transcripts for appeal.78 The implication is that the duty of a
state to provide for an exert witness does not extend beyond financ-
ing the efforts that the reasonable man of means would usually take
in securing a favorable expert. Thus, a state need not compensate
every handwriting expert or psychiatrist doing business on Main
Street because they all examined a defendant during the latter's door-
to-door search for a favorable expert opinion. The reasonable defen-
dant paying from his own pocket would make a selective, efficient
search.
3. Investigation and the Securing of Witnesses
Pre-trial investigators, a search for witnesses and factfinding in
general are often as essential to the process of rational truth-finding
as is the need for expert witnesses. The difference is that once the
issues have been defined the need for the assistance of an expert
witness is readily ascertainable at that point, whereas the extent of
the need for pre-trial investigation must be determined on a partic-
ular basis. Even if it is assumed that all defendants in all cases have
some need for such services, 79 the amount to be provided each defen-
dant will vary from case to case. 0 The problem of course is to
determine at what point a state can refuse to render an indigent
further assistance without running afoul of the equal protection
clause.
Again, as in the cases concerning provision of expert witnesses,
both due process and equal protection may be violated. The state has
established an adversary trial system that assumes equality of re-
sources among the parties and places upon the defendant the burden
of presenting his case; that system assumes that on identical issues in
77 3 Ohio St. 2d 80, 209 N.E.2d 410 (1965).
78 Id. at 81-82, 209 N.E.2d at 411.
79 Which assumption of course is not true. For example, if the only issue in the
trial is whether the defendant signed a forged check, it is conceivable that the testimony
of a handwriting expert is all that will be needed.
80 See 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 20, at 449.
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identical circumstances, different defendants will possess a similar
capacity to present their views with a similar probability of success.
If the indigent has no money for even the bare essentials of an inves-
tigation, or to pay a material witness traveling expenses and per diem
costs, or to travel himself to interview a witness, due process of law
is denied if the result of the defendant's poverty is to deprive him of a
minimally adequate trial.8 ' However, due process is not denied when
the indigent's request for funds to employ investigators is refused
on the ground that the state has already given him other assistance,
adequate and sufficient to insure a minimal litigation of the primary
issues.12 The state has provided assistance in sufficient degree to
alleviate any distressing results of a lack of the requested service.
But equal protection under Griffin and Douglas requires more
than this. The Supreme Court seemed to be concerned with the
reliability of our adversary process and its capacity to determine ac-
curately the guilt or innocence of an accused; their command to
states to minimize the litigious inequities resulting from differences
in the economic circumstances of rich and poor must be understood
in light of this concern. Thus, in considering an indigent's request
for particular pre-trial services to aid him in the preparation of his
defense, a judge cannot grant or deny those requests on a categorical
basis because the duty to grant or the freedom to deny the request
will vary. For example, the first inquiry would be whether or not the
defendant intends to use the funds for a "fishing expedition" that has
a low probability of adding to the truth-finding process. Denial of
such requests would not affect the reliability of our adversary process.
The second inquiry might be the purpose for which the defendant
seeks the aid. If it is to establish an alibi, for example, he may have
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He thus would
require more extensive financial assistance to aid him in gathering
facts than a defendant whose purpose is only to prevent the prose-
cutor from establishing his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Even
here, however, the duty to aid extends only so long as the investiga-
tion or search for witnesses may yet produce evidence or testimony
that will affect the reliability of the truth-finding process.
81 Whittington v. Gaither, 272 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
82 State v. Corliss, 430 P.2d 632, 639 (Mont. 1967) (defendant had been given at the
state's expense a psychiatric examination, a lie detector test and a daily transcript of
the trial).
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V. CONCLUSION
The administration of our criminal justice system has been one
of the primary concerns of the Supreme Court in the last decade. The
concern of the courts is no longer whether states have a duty to supply
aid in addition to counsel to indigent defendants, but rather how
extensive the aid must be.
The equal protection clause, considered in light of our adversary
system of adjudication and its accompanying assumptions, requires
that indigents have available to them substantially the same tools of
litigation that would be utilized by a non-indigent defendant in the
same circumstances, exercising prudence and concerned with a selec-
tive, efficient use of his personal resources. Such a standard to measure
the scope of a state's duty to aid indigents would enhance reliability
on our guilt determination process while satisfying the essential
requisite of our existing adversary system-equality of resources. The
immediate financial cost will be out-weighed by increased efficiency
at the trial level, and by the many personal and community economic
savings that will result from fewer erroneous convictions.
John K. Sterling
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